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In a crisis folded within the broader COVID-19 pandemic, public procurement during the
pandemic suddenly seemed incapable of satisfying its raison d'être, namely to provide public
institutions with the supplies they needed -- the masks, personal protective equipment and
respirators desperately needed by medical personnel, patients and ordinary citizens all over the
world. This crisis of confidence in public procurement deepened as hundreds of press articles1,
specialized magazines and blogs2 (the reaction on the internet has been almost as rapid as the
pandemic) exposed the dark corners of public purchasing of medical supplies, revealing
countless failures in this obscure corner of public administration.
On a legal level, the COVID-19 crisis, decidedly unlike any other, called into question many
pillars of public procurement law, including the longstanding assumption that direct negotiation
between public buyers and sellers should be avoided if at all possible3. The crisis overturned
the traditional order of the public procurement market: with the sudden spike in public demand,
suppliers and intermediaries took over the somnolent markets traditionally dominated by public
buyers. The pandemic, like Pandora opening her legendary box, released many evils as well as
hope – hope that stems from the new perspectives lent by the pandemic.
With this article we wish to review some of the most important elements of this purchasing
crisis, specifically the key disruptive forces which stand in stark contrast to traditional
approaches to public procurement. Several disruptions warrant attention: 1. The temporal
disruption, with the unprecedented and forced acceleration of purchasing procedures; 2. The
competition disruption, which caused an inversion of the characteristics of the public
purchasing market; 3. The epistemological disruption, i.e., the destruction of assumptions
grounded in a monopsonist’s market with sudden competition between public buyers; 4. The
geographic disruption due to the global dimension of the voracious public demand; 5. And
finally, the protectionist disruption – the way the pandemic paradoxically both fed and made
nonsense of the nationalism that normally surrounds public procurement markets.
After these observations, we will propose possible solutions, while mindful that the pandemic’s
extraordinary disruptions, though novel and jarring, were linked to an exceptional situation of
shortage across a limited range of supplies. The pandemic’s lessons should not be generalized
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beyond reason to dismantle the entire public procurement regime. But if the pandemic has laid
bare the need to rethink emergency public purchasing procedures, the crisis should also trigger
other improvements to traditional public purchasing mechanisms, while remaining true to
fundamental principles. As the discussion below reflects, the lessons from the pandemic
reinforce procurement’s traditional principles, for the pandemic showed why it is necessary for
public purchasers to: 1. Restore transparency and integrity even in emergencies; 2. Learn to buy
through an international supply chain; 3. Learn to buy collectively; and, 4. Regulate from a
holistic perspective that can adjust to rapid changes in public markets..
I.

Opening Pandora’s Box: The Pandemic’s Disruptions
1. The temporal disruption: the rapid obsolescence of the so-called "emergency"
purchasing procedures in the context of the Coronavirus crisis

One of the abiding assumptions in public procurement is that time flows like water – time is
considered a bountiful resource, one that can be freely allocated to resolve inefficiencies in a
system built around the agent – the purchasing official – rather than the principal (the
government and its users).4 Leisurely timelines are set by statutes and regulations, not by user’s
needs or market exigencies. Thus, for example, in important part because a purchasing official
may not have done sufficient market outreach, the U.S. system requires that a competition be
held open for 30 days after notice of the solicitation is published,5 to allow the market to
respond; after award, the European rules call for a 10-day “standstill”6 period to give
disappointed bidders a chance to challenge officials’ mistakes (themselves often the product of
officials’ indifference); and the U.S. system allows another 100 days for a bid challenge to be
resolved.7 Time allows the purchaser’s (the agent’s) mistakes and indifference to be corrected,
and the opportunity costs caused by long delays are typically borne by the user and the
contractor – not the agent/official. Where the opportunity costs of delay are acute and
unbearable, when there is a real emergency, then the rules allow expedition by short-cutting the
normal notice and competition requirements, but even then the rules anticipate an orderly
process and at least some measure of transparency.8 All of that, however, collapsed in many
places relatively early in the pandemic.

4
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To cope with the swelling medical needs during the pandemic, public purchasing procedures
loosened through successive phases over the course of a few weeks. Even if some purchasing
authorities expected in February 2020 (as the pandemic emerged) to launch open bidding
processes (that is to say, to follow traditional procedures), this first recourse to traditional
bidding procedures quickly reached its limits because the deadlines for filing and examining
offers were simply incompatible with the rapidly rising medical demands.
Then, from mid-March 2020, at least for France, the so-called "emergency" procedures with
shortened advertising deadlines (fewer than 15 days instead of 35 days) seemed the right
solution under the European Procurement Directives. To this end, the French Government
published an interpretation note of March 18 to encourage public buyers to reduce the usual
deadlines9.
However, this approach also quickly showed its limitations, because an even less restrictive
third procedure, the negotiated procedure without prior publicity under the European directives,
was much more flexible and seemed better adapted to the runaway situation of the COVID-19
market. After all, the purchases needed to deal with the brutal emergence of the epidemic
perfectly met the regulatory definition of urgency, and even of extreme urgency under the
European rules, that is to say a situation which is unpredictable, irresistible and external. As a
result, the European Commission recommended the negotiated procedure without prior
publication or direct agreement for use by the European Member States on April 1, 202010.
But, with the pandemic’s escalation at the end of March, and the unbridled demand in the
market for personal protective equipment desperately sought after by major world players, the
expedited procedures under traditional rules, though exceptional, were themselves abandoned
by many public buyers in favor of direct orders, without transparency or open competition, in
clear violation of long-established procurement rules and rules . Market players were explicit:
if available supplies could not be purchased and paid for quickly – sometimes within minutes
– those supplies could go to another buyer11.
With the rise of these purchasing techniques without any supervision, the traditional pillars of
public purchasing collapsed. Some nations, such as the Algeria, the Central African Republic,
China, Mexico, Poland, Senegal and Zimbabwe adopted laws specifically allowing contracting
authorities to derogate from their public procurement laws in making contract awards and
administering public contracts during the COVID-19 emergency12. Faced with the rising tide
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Emergency Procurement in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/27/emergency-procurement-in-the-covid-19-pandemicapril-2-2020/.
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), Policy Responses to COVID-19, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-andcovid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#P; Michal Kania (University of Silesia in Katowice), Public
Procurement and COVID-19 in Poland (2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Public-Procurement-and-COVID-19-in-Poland.-Michal-Kania.-31-March-2020.docx;
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of a pandemic, public buyers found themselves caught between the opportunistic demands of
suppliers and the urgency to meet needs -- to the point that the traditional bulwarks, the
principles of transparency and competition that undergird public procurement – gave way. The
COVID-19 crisis thus up-ended the traditional assumptions that shape public procurement.
2. The competition disruption: a supplier market
Another abiding assumption in public procurement has long been that, because of governments’
massive purchasing power, public procurement is a “buyer’s” market – indeed, the government
is often the only buyer, in a monopsony. This explained why public purchasers could afford to
underinvest in market engagement: suppliers focused on the public market, to survive, would
accommodate government delays and transaction costs. The problem was magnified in a way
not fully understood before the pandemic, because public markets were literally buyers’
markets, structured around contracting officials who serve as purchasing intermediaries. All of
that turned upside-down in the crush of the pandemic, as sellers of critical suppliers took the
upper hand. While public markets in principle allow public buyers to take advantage of a
dominant position (even a monopsony in certain sectors, such as armaments), in a market
normally characterized by a multitude of suppliers who compete for the public bonanza, the
situation was completely reversed in the context of the health crisis. Taking advantage of the
surging demand from governments that suddenly became competitors in purchasing the same
products, suppliers and sometimes unscrupulous intermediaries not only set prices far above
previous prices but also demanded conditions normally prohibited by public procurement rules
(such as advance payment). Worse still, as suppliers abandoned commitments to public
purchasers to take advantage of new, more attractive prices, certain contracts were not honored.
Across the globe, direct buying on vendor terms replaced orthodox public procurement
techniques that traditionally require scrupulous checks on company guarantees and a tightly
framed system of advance payments. On March 24, for example, a cross-section of front-line
purchasers from Europe and the Americas explained during an international webinar how
buyers’ and sellers’ relative power had reversed in the pandemic.13 Obliged to find vital supplies
as quickly as possible, Italian procuring entities had been authorized by a succession of
exceptional regulatory provisions14 to accept vendors’ demands for advance payments which
are normally prohibited in Italian public procurement law.
To understand the scope of this supply crisis, it is necessary to segment the analysis according
to the types of markets, between industrialized and developing economies. Not only has public
demand grown exponentially during the pandemic, but for certain off-the-shelf commercial
products such as masks or hydroalcoholic gels, private demand has helped multiply needs and
exacerbate competition among potential buyers. This imbalance in the market for health
supplies first struck the most developed countries, which were better able to cope with the
resulting rising prices. On the other hand, the delayed spread of the pandemic in the poorest
countries raised other questions, in particular whether the international community would
Open Contracting Partnership & ONG 3D, When Covid-19 Confirms the Need for Open Contracting in Senegal
(2020), https://www.developmentgateway.org/OC-Senegal.
13
Webinar – Public Contracts and the Coronavirus – Online Colloquium (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/16/public-contracts-and-the-coronavirus-online-colloquiummarch-24-2020/
14
Dentons Files: « COVID-19 and derogations from the procurement code in Italy », 16 mars 2020, available at
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/covid-19-and-derogations-from-the-52116/
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provide necessary support as those poorer nations confronted radically higher prices. This
growing rift in the market, exacerbated by competition between buyers, was finally addressed
by the World Bank in early May 2020, when it proposed to assist its beneficiary nations through
a new means of assistance, by presenting vendors to interested governments15.
3. The epistemological disruption: competition between public buyers
As was noted above, the pandemic uprooted classic means of procurement because scarcity of
critical supplies gave suppliers control in the market. The global and savage competition for
scarce supplies had another disruptive effect: it pitted governments against one another, turning
complacent monopsonists into aggressively competing buyers. This disruption might be termed
an epistemological one – one that threatened to destroy the premises for the discipline of public
procurement – because it raised serious questions as to whether procurement should be left to
corps of public procurement officials governed by a commonly recognized set of norms and
rules. This disruption thus ran much deeper, for when governments competed openly against
other governments, and governments were held publicly accountable for their failures to
procure essential supplies, stakeholders asked aloud whether the public procurement system
might not be replaced by another logistical arrangement better able to users’ needs. The crisis
in the market, in other words, led to a crisis in confidence, and opened the door to a fundamental
shift in the way we think about public procurement.
Thanks to a rush for common medical supplies, as noted the logic of public purchasing was
reversed, and vendors found themselves in a dominant position to raise prices; at the same time,
because the pandemic caused the same health calamity in many nations simultaneously,
governments competed with each other fiercely for supplies, even within the same country. As
the pandemic unfolded over days and weeks, public reports revealed the intensity of
competition between governments, some with considerable financial means -- China, the
United States, Italy or France in particular -- against others much less fortunate, such as North
African countries that were quickly affected by the pandemic and those of sub-Saharan Africa
to a, so far, lesser extent.
But governments’ competitive purchasing during the pandemic also devastated weaker public
buyers within nations, such as local governments, public hospitals or retirement homes, which
were trying to protect their workers and their patients. Here again, the competitive situation
strongly disadvantaged small public buyers. The search for key equipment such as masks
became a true race, such as through online auction sites in the United States on which both
public central purchasing bodies and large public buyers positioned themselves for vital
purchases.
This startling competition between public buyers reflected major shortcomings in coordination
and collaboration, and unforeseen limits to decentralization or federalism, sometimes fueled by
political concerns, as demonstrated by the situation in Spain. In the United States, the Trump
administration’s willingness to use federal powers 16 to usurp state governments’ purchasing –
15

Enzo de Laurentis, “COVID-19: How the World Bank is helping countries procure critical medical supplies”,
https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/covid-19-how-world-bank-helping-countries-procure-critical-medicalsupplies?cid=ECR_E_NewsletterWeekly_EN_EXT&deliveryName=DM63224.
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L. Folliot Lalliot, « Comment Trump instrumentalise l’approvisionnement », Website of the French weekly
news L’Express, April 20, 2020, available at https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/idees-et-debats/comment-trumpinstrumentalise-l-approvisionnement-en-masques-aux-etats-unis_2124131.html
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literally, to seize supplies which had been bought by state governments, even though state
governments constitutionally have first responsibility for public health -- even led some state
governors to threaten the use of force to block federal requisitions of medical devices. This
would have been resulted in a direct confrontation between federal and state armed forces,
essentially unknown since the U.S. Civil War ended in 186517. This was clearly a market in
collapse, a dystopian marketplace.
To understand the depth of this disruption, and the scope of the potential remedies, it is
important to stress that this was a crisis of legitimacy: the governments that could not procure
vital goods in a time of natural disaster risked losing their mandate to govern. The assumption
that has always informed critical thinking about public procurement is that, however inefficient
it may be, the established system of public procurement is preferable to the chaotic and corrupt
buying that would otherwise undermine governments’ legitimacy. The pandemic in many ways
destroyed that assumption, and as the discussion below will show, this conceptual revolution –
this destruction of the epistemological foundations of public procurement – may lead to
radically different pathways for reform.
4. The geographic disruption
International trade instruments which address public procurement, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), were gradually built after
World War II to facilitate access for foreign vendors by removing non-tariff barriers to public
procurement markets18. By way of illustration, at the European level, the legal framework of
the EU Public Procurement Directives was designed to encourage European public contracting
authorities to broaden their base of suppliers beyond preferred local vendors: per the GPA,
above certain monetary thresholds, not only European companies but also vendors from other
members of the GPA (such as Japan and South Korea) are eligible to compete without
discrimination.
Acting as an accelerator, the pandemic has driven open public procurement markets, forcing
Western contracting authorities (even the most reluctant19) to turn to Asian suppliers to fill
domestic gaps in supply. In fact, production of key COVID-19 medical supplies was highly
concentrated in China 20 a country which is not (for the moment) party to the GPA, and which
does not have a trade agreement governing procurement trade with the European Union or the
United States.
17

See, e.g. Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Jack Nicas, ‘Swept Up by FEMA’: Complicated Medical Supply System Sows
Confusion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2020 (noting that the “Trump administration’s new method for distributing medical
supplies has led to charges of confiscation”), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/coronavirus-femamedical-supplies.html.
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See, e.g., Robert A. Anderson & Anna Caroline Muller, The Revised WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features and Significance for Global Trade and Development (2017), WTO
Staff Working Papers ERSD-2017-04, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics
Division, https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wtowps/ersd201704.html.
19
Senior members of the Trump administration have indicated that the United States is considering withdrawing
from the Government Procurement Agreement. E.g., Robert D. Anderson & Christopher R. Yukins, Withdrawing
the United States from the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA): Assessing Potential Damage to the
U.S. and Its Contracting Community, 62 Gov. Contr. ¶ 35 (Thomson Reuters, Feb. 12, 2020), GWU Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2020-08; Jean Heilman Grier, Significance of Access to Sub-central Procurement under GPA,
6 May 2020, available at https://trade.djaghe.com/.
20
See Simon Evenett et al. , Global Trade Alert, Tackling COVID-19 Together (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports/51.
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Consequently, this episode of massive international public procurement took place largely
outside the trade instruments that were designed to facilitate public procurement trade. This
apparent paradox arose because these instruments were designed to redirect trade in a stable
global public procurement market, and those who framed the agreements did not foresee such
a catastrophic situation. Certainly the trade negotiators envisaged the possibility of a public
health crisis21, but then only to allow a State party to refuse access to foreign companies, and
to purchase solely from domestic companies.
In the COVID-19 upheaval, nations found themselves in the precisely opposite situation, in
which they hoped to increase their purchases from foreign suppliers22. In one prominent
example of this conundrum, the United States lifted restrictions on the sale of certain key
supplies which would normally be subject to the Buy American Act23.
The COVID-19 crisis thus revealed a bias deeply embedded in international public procurement
trade instruments: in order to facilitate access for foreign companies, these instruments (such
as the GPA) focus on a relatively narrow band of trade barriers – overtly discriminatory
measures such as “buy national” laws and crabbed procurement procedures devised to exclude
foreign vendors. By focusing on ex ante requirements in order to stimulate competition, these
trade instruments have largely overlooked the upstream controls and certifications which this
pandemic showed can be much more important to cross-border trade in public procurement
markets. Even within the framework of the European Public Procurement Directives, which do
address certifications and restrictive labels in European procurement markets, the gaps in the
regulatory structure became clear when governments purchased Chinese supplies incompatible
with European standards24, and goods with fraudulent certifications with counterfeit labels used
by malicious suppliers. The pandemic showed, in sum, that while trade negotiators had long
sought to open international procurement markets, how those transborder procurements would
work in practice too often had been ignored.
5. The protectionist disruption – emergency trade controls on essential supplies
Just as too little attention had been paid to how to control cross-border trade, the pandemic
showed that there are far too few controls in place to keep trade channels open when they are
essential to save lives. Protectionism – both import and export controls – ran riot in the
pandemic, as governments responded to popular pressures to close their borders. Those trade
restraints included efforts to “on-shore” production of essential supplies by discouraging
foreign competition, and export controls to keep critical supplies from flowing abroad. Because
of the uneven spread of the pandemic, and the need to respond flexibly to new outbreaks in new
populations, these clumsy trade barriers threatened to increase the death toll from the pandemic.
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Robert A. Anderson, Keeping markets open while ensuring due flexibility for governments in a time of economic
and public health crisis: the role of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 2020 Pub. Proc. L.
Rev. (forthcoming).
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However, we can advance the idea that this exception could play in the future, if the countries which launched
mass productions of sanitary products and equipment found themselves in a situation of surplus: they would then
be tempted to invoke this exception of public health to favor local suppliers.
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24

Pour faire face à cette situation dans l’urgence de la crise du COVID, la Commission Européenne et le CEN (Comité
européen de normalisation) ont rendu gratuit l’accès aux standards européens pour les produits manquants afin de faciliter leur
mise en production (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_502)?
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The phenomenon a speculative market with a sharp rise in demand is a well-known economic
situation, which is especially common in petroleum markets. But it is very rare in public
procurement markets for many countries to seek large quantities of the same supplies around
the world. It should be noted that this sudden surge in demand did not come from all countries
together, since the epidemic struck successively at different times and to varying degrees; peak
demand was reached when there was convergence of demand from countries which had
particularly high purchasing power (United States, Europe). These countries therefore found
themselves in competition to buy the same products which came primarily from domestic
sources and China (since Chinese production was predominant in masks and personal protective
equipment (PPE)).
The case of China is particularly interesting because, as the first country to fall victim to the
pandemic, and a primary source of essential medical supplies, China’s reaction had a major
collateral impact on international public purchasing operations25. The Chinese government
quickly opted for strong collaboration between the public and private sectors by combining
both the purchasing and production functions in a structure dedicated to the fight against
COVID-19. The Chinese firms were thus able to benefit from fiscal support measures to embark
on the massive production, the State having undertaken to buy any surplus.26
Many other countries resorted to aggressive import and export controls in an attempt to
maximize access to essential supplies and materials. To husband their available supplies, for
example, some nations in Europe imposed new controls on exports, which the European Union
quickly moved to channel – but not abolish – by asserting its prerogative to control transborder
trade. 27. In the United States, President Trump triggered the federal government’s powers
(though after a widely criticized delay28) the Defense Production Act of 1950,29 a Cold Warera statute which gave Trump broad authority to control production and distribution of key
supplies. Trump used that authority under the Defense Production Act in a number of
emergency measures, including one to block exports of certain personal protective equipment.
30
The Trump administration also started the process of “on-shoring” key manufacturing of
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Explanations shared at the Webinar “Emergency procurement in the Covid 19 pandemic”du 2 avril 2020 by
CAO Fuguo, Professor at the Law School of the Central University of Finance and Economics (Director, China
Procurement
Research
Center)
(Beijing,
China),
available
at:
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/27/emergency-procurement-in-the-covid-19-pandemicapril-2-2020/
26
In the United States, the federal government bears a similar risk of surplus production through standard
termination for convenience clauses, which provide that if contracts are terminated prematurely for the
government’s convenience, the government will reimburse the contractor its sunk costs. See, e.g., Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-2, 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2, Termination for Convenience of the Government.
For a broader discussion of the standard. clauses and their role in the U.S. government’s allocation of risks in the
pandemic, see Christopher R. Yukins, U.S. Procurement and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020 Pub. Proc. L. Rev.
(Sweet & Maxwell, forthcoming).
27
Thus the European Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/402 of 14 March 2020 making the
exportation of certain products subject to the production of an export authorization, that is COVID related supplies
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020R0402
28
Christopher R. Yukins, Trump’s Procurement Mistake May Cost American Lives, 20 mars 2020, Blog
PublicProcurementInternational available at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/20/trumpsprocurement-mistake-may-cost-american-lives/
29
[50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 et se. Available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1650-204905258/final__defense_production_act_091030.pdf
30
On April 10, 2020 the Federal Emergency Management Agency imposed export controls under the Defense
Production Act on personal protection equipment, including certain masks and gloves.
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medical supplies,31 a long-term, multi-faceted initiative which (among other things) is expected
to use domestic preferences in procurement to encourage U.S.-based manufacturing, to secure
supply chains for future crises but also to further the Trump administration’s “economic
nationalism” and create U.S. manufacturing jobs to bolster Trump’s political base. (The
European Union notably eschewed this “on-shoring” strategy, recognizing the deeply
established international supply chains for medical supplies.32).
These were just some of the many trade controls that countries around the world imposed, in
aggressive efforts to garner a larger share of scarce international supplies33 -- protectionist
measures which, it should be noted, followed years of mounting protectionism during a period
of rising nationalism in many nations.34 Those trade restrictions magnified the global economic
disparities between rich and poor nations – disparities which were highlighted even more
harshly when press stories emerged of the buying power of wealthier nations, such as reports
of agents carrying suitcases full of cash to preempt other buyers for critical supplies.35
These trade measures limiting the import and export of critical medical supplies had secondary
effects which were only dimly understood during the pandemic. Because of the slow and
uneven spread of the pandemic around the globe, demand for life-saving supplies surged in
different countries at different times. These trade measures remained in place, however, even
as the pandemic receded and demand declined in the nations which had imposed these controls.
As a result, it was more difficult to shift essential supplies to those countries which needed them
most, as the pandemic continued its march across the world – a largely unforeseen and deadly
effect of many nations’ emergency protectionist measures. Notably, international organizations
such as the United Nations remained exempt from these trade controls, which meant that they
could fulfill the humanitarian mission of distributing supplies while bypassing national trade
controls.36
II. Solving the equation: revolution and improvements
As the discussion above reflected, the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed the traditional, often
complacent systems and norms of public procurement around the world The life-or-death
demand for immediate supplies made it impossible to tolerate the delays normally part of public
31

See, e.g., Ann Samson, Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trump-drugs.html.
32
Alan Beattie & Jim Brunsden, EU should ‘not aim for self-sufficiency’ after coronavirus, trade chief says,
Financial Times, Apr. 23, 2020, available at www.ft.com.
33
It was reported that 93 countries have adopted more than 120 measures on trade in medical products since the
beginning of 2020: European University Institute, Global Trade Alert & World Bank Initiative “21st Century
Tracking of Pandemic-Era Trade Policies in Food and Medical Products”,4 May 2020, available at
https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports.
34
Zornitsa Kutlina-Dimitrova, “Government Procurement: Data, trends and protectionist tendencies, EU Chief
Economist
Note,
Issue
3,
Sept.
2018,
available
at
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157319.pdf
35
See, e.g., Noam N. Levey & Noah Bierman, As Trump lets private sector supply the coronavirus fight, the wellconnected often get first dibs, L.A. Times, Apr. 1, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-0401/coronavirus-medical-equipment-goes-to-well-connected; Shuki Sadeh, In Israel’s Race to Get Medical Gear,
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procurement; this highlighted the “agency” issues (contracting officials’ inefficiency in
achieving outcomes) which have long dogged public procurement. The crush of the pandemic
also transformed a buyers’ public procurement market into a sellers’ market, and forced those
government buyers to compete bitterly with one another – disruptions which shook fundamental
assumptions that traditionally shaped the norms and rules of public procurement. Finally, the
pandemic made plain shortcomings in cross-border trade, at a time when access to global supply
chains was critically needed.
The questions, then, is what lessons can be learned from the COVID-19 crisis? Public
procurement law, much like other areas of public action touched by the pandemic, must
reinvent itself, but to what extent? To cope with the health emergencies that other disasters
could bring, and the demands of a globalized, technologically sophisticated market, a revolution
is necessary. Although purchases of medical supplies represent only a small part of the trillions
of dollars in annual public purchases, the lessons from the current crisis could hasten
improvements that reach across public procurement, and transcend borders.
1. Restore transparency and integrity even in emergencies
Too many governments used the COVID-19 emergency as a ready excuse to free themselves
from compliance with the standards of public procurement that are today internationally
recognized: transparency and integrity, equal competitive access and equal treatment of
businesses, best value and efficiency. The pandemic saw direct orders, sometimes simply
placed over the phone, the use of unknown intermediaries or unverified suppliers, and other
derogations dictated by urgency but which could lead to serious breaches of the principles of
transparency and integrity which must inform all public purchases. Not only do these rushed
practices open the door to favoritism or corruption37, but they can also foster embezzlement and
fraud, the consequences of which can be particularly dramatic in the field of health38.
A first lesson of the pandemic, therefore, is that it is necessary to insist that even during an
emergency, procedures must remain transparent and traceable, at least ex post with the
obligation to publish post-award notices containing the main information on the contract.
Although a durably transparency and accountable process may be required by the European
Directives, even during an emergency, those norms are not always honored by EU Member
States’ laws on procurements below the European monetary thresholds, and transparency and
accountability sometimes disappeared entirely in other countries which hastily exempted
COVID-19 contracting from their normal public procurement rules.
As more public purchasing procedures move online, the publication of award notices on the
internet should take place quickly, and the data should be readily identifiable (on a regularly
37
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used public website, for example), and accessible and machine-readable in keeping with
standard principles of open contracting.39 To focus accountability, the data related to
emergency contracting may be gathered on a governmental online repository dedicated to the
crisis, which allows for easy accounting of contracts awarded to deal with the disaster. Lithuania
has set up such a platform for the COVID-19 pandemic40. In terms of governance and
transparency, civil society thus benefits from a more facile understanding of public action,
which helps to thwart rumors and restore confidence in the public buyer’s legitimacy.
Transparency has another incidental benefit when supplies must be reallocated as a disaster
advances across the globe: transparent procurement will allow other buyers insights into where
critically needed supplies may be stockpiled. This lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic
reinforced an emerging principle in public contracting: as the transaction costs of transparency
drop through advances in information technology, and market players grow increasingly
accustomed to transparency and accountability, because the positive externalities of
transparency are almost impossible to predict, public policy tends presumptively to tilt towards
transparency.
Restoring integrity – taking the functional and reputational measures necessary to bolster the
legitimacy and efficiency of a government procurement system41 -- also required effective
sanctions mechanisms in the pandemic: sanctions against unjustified cartels or price-gouging
imposed by competition authorities, sanctions against corruption imposed by criminal courts or
by anti-corruption authorities, and criminal sanctions against fraud.
While some nations already have an extensive arsenal of laws to combat fraud and corruption
in public procurement, other nations have not yet adopted such mechanisms or do not have the
effective means to implement them. The False Claims Act42 in the United States, for example,
allows a whistleblower to bring a fraud claim in the government’s name, and ultimately to share
in the government’s recovery for defective products or other forms fraud (recoveries which can
be massive, because of draconian penalties under the law). These types of fraud remedies are
relatively rare in other countries, and reports of widespread fraud during the pandemic pointed
up the need to assimilate anti-fraud measures into other procurement systems.
Vendors’ often unreliable performance during the pandemic also pointed up the need for
governments to share information about dubious vendors more efficiently, and the need to
exclude from public markets those vendors that pose unacceptable reputational and
performance risks.43 Reports emerged during the pandemic of public purchasers sharing
39
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information with public law enforcement authorities regarding new vendors, including
information regarding criminal activity and defective manufacturing. This alliance between
public officials indirectly affects a collateral question that arose from the pandemic: whether
government supply chains should be diversified (and thus reinforced) by using public or private
intermediaries. The pressures of the pandemic – especially the need for public officials to
exchange confidential information on vendor qualification quickly – highlighted the benefits of
publicly run supply chains, an issue discussed further below.
The pandemic highlighted a new issue with sanctions: the relative costs and benefits of
different enforcement strategies in an extremely fragile market. While governments have long
recognized that excluding vendors could reduce competition, few governments have assessed
the competitive impacts of more serious sanctions, such as criminal penalties for fraud or price
gouging. Governments, in other words, have often assumed that criminal behavior should be
punished without considering the competitive effects of the punishment.44 During the
pandemic, however, it became clear that governments might want to choose their enforcement
priorities carefully: while punishing fraudulent suppliers was a necessary part of ensuring
integrity in the supply chain, punishing overpriced suppliers (“price-gougers”) could be
disastrous in a rapidly rising market. Confronted with sanctions45 or controls46 for high prices,
vendors could simply go elsewhere – potentially leaving the government with no available
sources of supply. The pandemic showed, in other words, that not coordinating enforcement
efforts with procurement goals could generate serious costs for the government in its dual role
as buyer and enforcer.
The pandemic also showed that any criminal sanctions should be accompanied by a systematic
exclusion of the companies concerned from public contracts, either because of corruption or
fraud at the time of the award phase, or because of dishonest behavior during performance47. In
many systems, these exclusions must be published online – what is, in effect, a way for public
buyers to share qualification information across borders. However, the COVID-19 health crisis
revealed a shortcoming in this system which will have to be remedied: because of procedural
44
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protections afforded vendors which slow the exclusion process, often these sanctions
(exclusions) came too late to mitigate risk effectively, either in the procuring government or in
other governments that might rely upon that information for their own assessments of vendors’
qualification..
The pandemic, by compressing the procurement cycle and reducing user tolerance for
unqualified vendors (because shoddy goods could pose mortal danger), thus raised new
questions about how to manage the risk presented by firms which have not yet been formally
excluded but which seem unreliable. Certainly traditional checks on the supporting documents
and certificates presented can reveal fraud, but how to manage suspicions regarding an
unknown company – especially when surging demand presses buyers to consider any available
supplier?
In the midst of the crisis, some buyers exchanged unofficial lists of companies that were
suspicious or had not fulfilled previous contractual obligations, and the buyers avoided those
suppliers. In other cases, buyers would trade only with suppliers that had been in the market
before the pandemic. These informal measures on the fringes of the law (the European
procurement directive contemplates only formal, transparent exclusion, for example) revealed
a loophole in integrity mechanisms. Faced with this situation, the World Bank allows borrower
nations to provisionally suspend vendors48 (much like the United States allows temporary
suspension, with notice and an opportunity to be heard49).
The question, then, is how to bridge between the informal (and perhaps illegal) exclusion
measures taken by public buyers to mitigate risk during the pandemic, and the formal exclusions
framed by law? One solution might be to automatically cross-exclude vendors50 that pose
unacceptable risk, much like the cross-debarment mechanism used by multilateral banks51 since
2010, which gives automatic effect at all the participating banks to a ban imposed by one
financial institution. That type of automatic, universal exclusion might be reserved for certain
critical products, such as medical supplies in a pandemic, for which performance and
reputational risks cannot be sustained. Alternatively, public buyers might consider better means
of sharing information on vendor qualification, such as using diplomatic networks to monitor
local suppliers in countries where production of essential supplies is concentrated? Again,
this critical lesson of the pandemic – that buyers need ready access to vendor qualification
information, and will form informal networks to gather intelligence on vendors when traditional
means prove inadequate – suggests that public supply chains run by public purchasers will
always hold a special advantage over the private suppliers that stand ready to take over the
public purchasing function, as is discussed below.
All of these measures point to a central lesson from the pandemic: the “temporal” crisis in
procurement (the procurement system’s inability to buy quickly enough to meet surging
demand from the public) was only the tip of an iceberg of much larger “agency” problems in
procurement – the inability of a purchasing officials, as agents/intermediaries in the supply
48
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chain, to respond adequately to the needs of their principals, including their end-users. To solve
that problem, the first instinct of many in the crisis was to abandon traditional requirements of
transparency and integrity, and to open the door to “emergency” procurements outside the
established rule systems. As the discussion above shows, however, a better answer would be
to remain true to those core principles, to ensure that procurement in a disaster was done with
transparency and integrity, but to do so in a thoughtful way that adapted to the extraordinary
impacts of the COVID-19 disease.
2.

Learn how to buy abroad

While the globalized economy has been blamed for the spread of the health crisis, with China
at the epicenter, the inability of most public contracting authorities to manage global supply
chains to mitigate the pandemic should also be taken into account. Buying from distant
suppliers is a true job, a set of functions (market research, trade and customs rules, purchasing,
logistics, transport, inventory management, etc.) which, even if they are well known to the
private sector, too often are not well understood in the public sector52. Establishing trust in the
manufacturing centers, regularly verifying the techniques implemented, controlling deliveries,
are all steps that require time and special skills. Large private firms thus prefer to establish
reliable supplier networks , monitored by subsidiaries or local correspondents, which meet their
requirements or, failing that, rely on recognized testing, inspection and certification services
bodies. In France, the announcement that protective masks were available for sale in massmarket stores even as public authorities struggled to stock the minimum numbers required by
exposed public workers illustrated this contrasting control of supply chains.
While sourcing techniques are in fashion, especially in Europe, they should now be given an
international dimension to improve knowledge of overseas markets, with creativity and focus.
For example, why not use diplomatic networks -- usually mobilized to promote their national
businesses – to monitor local manufacturers in countries where critical suppliers are
concentrated? Or leverage local government oversight, as the United States traditionally has
used contract administration resources in the Canadian government to monitor Canadian
suppliers which are an extended part of the defense industrial base in the United States?53 Or
use online certification mechanisms, supported by digital “blockchain” solutions, to reinforce
transnational supply chains?
In the United States, notably, the federal government’s response to failures in the international
supply chain during the pandemic has been almost precisely the opposite – as noted, a
protectionist call to “on-shore” manufacturing of key medical supplies, including
pharmaceuticals, despite repeated warnings from industry that the supply chain in deeply
transnational. The U.S. Department of Defense has played a leading role in assessing what
manufacturing might be brought back to the United States.54 The move to abandon international
52
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supply chains is driven in part by national security concerns (China, a main supplier, is
increasingly viewed by the United States as a rival and antagonist), but the “on-shoring”
initiative is also driven by a protectionist and politically driven impulse to use public
procurement to expand manufacturing jobs in the United States. Much of Trump’s political base
is in workers displaced by a globalized economy; rebuilding the manufacturing sector in the
United States is a key political goal of his administration. Whether the Trump administration’s
“on-shoring” initiative will succeed will take years to assess; what is clear, however, is that the
Trump administration’s response to procurement failures in the pandemic confirm that political
pressures amplify the “agency” issues in procurement, by exposing supply chain decisions to
political goals.
The pandemic has revealed shortcomings in nations’ security of supply – in their ability to
access essential supplies in a time of crisis. That insecurity of supply can be traced in part to
public purchasers’ failure to understand and manage international supply chains effectively.
Some nations (such as the United States), encouraged by political and social pressures, have
responded to those procurement failures by shortening the supply chains, and moving to
manufacture in their home markets; others have not. Those failures in procurement across
international supply chains were not surprising, as from an operational perspective, buying
abroad puts a good deal of pressure on the public procurement workforce, which was already
in need for strengthening. That is why another solution – combining forces to buy cooperatively
-- could be a better approach for streamlining and optimizing the way to buy and stock essential
goods.
3. Learn how to buy together
As the discussion above noted, the COVID-19 pandemic turned public procurement markets
upside-down: the balance of power in markets for critical medical supplies shifted decidedly
from the public buyers (who traditionally dominate public procurement markets) to the sellers,
and the buyers began to compete aggressively among themselves. The public procurement
functions were clearly broken; the question, then, was to fix them. As many observed during
the crisis, one logical response would be for public purchasers to combine their market power
and expertise, to buy together. This section reviews how that coordinated purchasing solution
has been implemented in both the United States and Europe, and then, focusing on the U.S.
experience, assesses two radically different initiatives to extend coordinated purchasing in the
wake of the pandemic.
From the perspective of public procurement alone, questions abound, both nationally and
internationally. How to strengthen the coordination of purchases within nations? How to
organize the national centralization of purchases in order to build on the power of state
negotiation, with effective mechanisms of local orders and redistributions even when there is a
strong political decentralization? There are solutions to these problems, already recognized in
U.S. and EU law: joint procurement (known a “cooperative purchasing” in the United States)
across borders. The mechanisms for cooperative procurement are already in place.
The cooperative purchasing mechanisms worked -- if imperfectly -- in the United States, under
the Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contracts sponsored by the federal General Services
Administration (GSA) (the federal government’s main centralized purchasing agency), and at
the state and local level most prominently under the National Association of State Procurement
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Officials (NASPO) “ValuePoint” contracts55. The GSA contracts allowed federal, state, local
and tribal officials to purchase emergency supplies from common federal contracts.56 The
NASPO ValuePoint contracts allowed state and local governments to do the same from standing
contracts, and NASPO played a coordinating role between state and local purchasers in the
pandemic.
Cooperation among U.S. governments was marred, as noted, by the federal government’s
aggressive use of its powers under the Defense Production Act to arrogate critical supplies to
the national stockpile, even if that meant diverting supplies already purchased by state
governments. This meant that the federal government had ultimate control over the supply
chain for critical supplies, even though state governments have first constitutional responsibility
for public health in their respective jurisdictions.57 This also meant, in practice, that decisions
regarding medical supplies were being made at the federal level, at least two steps removed
from the users who actually needed the supplies – the medical personnel and patients on the
front lines of the pandemic, who normally were overseen directly by state (not federal) officials.
The experience in Europe was different, less robust and less fluid than in the United States, but
also a very public step forward in joint procurement undertaken cooperatively among the
European states. The European initiative was undertaken in response to a severe shortage of
necessary medical supplies among the European nations.58
On the basis of a voluntary joint procurement agreement concluded with the European Member
States (as well as with the United Kingdom and Norway) which allowed the joint purchase of
equipment, the European Commission launched four calls for tender different offers for medical
equipment: February 28 (surgical gloves and gowns), March 17 (personal protective equipment
to protect the eyes and respiratory tract, and respirators and other ventilation equipment) and
March 19 (medical laboratory equipment, including test kits), in which up to 25 Member States
participated59. The European response seemed to falter, because the procedures chosen resulted
in delays in expected deliveries and the quantities ordered could be insufficient to meet needs.
However, these group purchases marked real progress in coordination, which should be further
improved in the future. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
article 168, public health is the first responsibility of each Member State, while the Union has
complementary competence to support coordination among Member States and to combat
“major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their
prevention, as well as health information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and
combating serious cross-border threats to health.” The voluntary joint procurement agreement
initiative activated in 2020 was created in 2013, following the SARS epidemic, when the
55
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European Parliament60 advocated for a "global and concerted approach by the Member States".
This concern dates back to the European Parliament resolution of 8 March 2011, and to the
Council conclusions of 13 September 2010, after the H1N1 epidemic, which had already
stressed “the need to set up a common procedure for joint procurement relating to medical
countermeasures, in particular pandemic vaccines (in order to allow) more equitable access to
vaccines for the States concerned” 61. These mechanisms are based on "framework agreements,"
essentially catalog contracts set up between commercial suppliers and governments. Agencies
can then order from the catalogs as needed, in a second stage. These are thus called "two-stage
framework agreements." Multiple framework agreements are awarded to mitigate supply and
price risks, which can be further reduced by encouraging efficient and transparent competition
(Internet-based) in the second stage amongst the catalog contractors. On a European scale, it is
estimated62 that 20% of the markets in all fields combined are signed by framework agreements
(55% in Great Britain); they are equally popular in the United States, and the GSA MAS and
the NASPO ValuePoint contracts used in the pandemic and referenced above are framework
agreements.63
These framework agreements allow central purchasing agencies (CPAs) to pool purchases.
National agencies such as CONSIP in Italy or UGAP in France, federal agencies such as GSA
in the United States, or regional central purchasing bodies have played an essential role in
supply management because they have optimized the strength of public acquisition. In France,
some CPAs (in the south and in Ile-de-France) have even accepted orders from private
companies which had to quickly equip themselves with disinfection products to be able to
resume their activities during the pandemic64. On the other hand, perhaps still too numerous
and poorly coordinated, the CPAs sometimes exacerbate competition between public buyers,
as shown by the example of the regional Italian CPAs of Milan (Lombardi) and Turin
(Piemonte) which competed for the same virus control devices. It should be noted that in India,
to avoid this risk, centralization has been taken to the extreme since the Indian government has
designated a single CPA (HLL Lifecare Limited) in charge of supplies for all public hospitals
in the whole country65.
Joint procurement under two-stage framework agreements allows for concentration of demand
while leaving purchasing decisions at the local level; precisely what is needed in an emergency.
It also allows ready transparency and a means for governments to reallocate supplies quickly.
Joint procurement "levels" the governments (they are all equals in the framework arrangement),
60
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and makes it easier to exempt critical supplies from tariff barriers and export controls that can
cost lives. In an emergency such as the situation created by the epidemic, it is important that
these framework agreements can accept new public buyers, as was the case in South Africa66,
or can evolve to adapt to the needs as designed by the United Kingdom67.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, joint procurement across a network of governments
allows for "virtual stockpiles" when governments (as almost always occurs) lack the resources
or the political will to stockpile for the future. This is a critical "carrot" to attract large countries
(such as the United States) that would otherwise avoid joint procurement (much as the United
Kingdom failed to join the EU's joint procurement initiative). A "virtual stockpile" reduces
costs and political risks for the future, and is a ready "win" to point to, for besieged politicians.
In Europe, decisions n ° 1313/2013 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
December 2013 had resulted in the creation of a civil protection mechanism (RescUE68)
endowed with aerial firefighting capabilities, air evacuation capabilities and emergency medical
team capabilities. With the COVID-19 crisis it was urgently necessary to provide it with
medical materials and equipment by Commission Decision (EU) 2020/414 of March 19, 202069.
In parallel, the European Medical Agency (EMA) is closely monitoring the supply and stocks
of medicines with national authorities, and the EU pharmaceutical industry to prevent any
shortage.
To put the joint purchasing initiatives in perspective, it is worthwhile considering two U.S.
initiatives which are just beginning and which are intended to make the government’s supply
chains more resilient and responsive. The first is the federal government’s initiative to
consolidate and coordinate demand – what is called “an aggregated demand signal” – to
provision the National Strategic Stockpile to prepare for future pandemics.70 The government
has asked for recommendations from industry, and one industry group has called on the
government “to provide a clear, aggregated demand signal to manufactures and distributors [of
critical medical supplies], to include a demand plan, supply plan, and reconciliation review” –
an approach which, if adopted, would yield a highly centralized planning and purchasing
scheme for demand aggregation. The second initiative is a pending GSA procurement which
would allow federal officials (any federal users -- not necessarily contracting officials) to make
“micro-purchases” (up to $10,000) directly from online electronic marketplaces such as
Amazon.com. This initiative would profoundly decentralize purchasing authority, and would
allow users to bypass the normal cumbersome procurement process to fulfill their needs directly
(including, presumably, demands for emergency supplies).
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South Africa COVID 19 Instruction Note 8 (Mar. 19, 2020) https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/National-Treasury-Instruction-08-2019-2020.pdf
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UK Cabinet Office, “Procurement Policy Note - Responding to COVID-19” Information Note PPN 01/20 March
2020
available
at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873521/PPN_
01-20_-_Responding_to_COVID19.v5__1_.pdf
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Financed at 90% by the EU Commission, the stockpile of will be hosted by one or several Member States. The
hosting State will be responsible for procuring the intensive care medical equipment such as ventilators, personal
protective
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vaccines
and
therapeutics,
and
laboratory
supplies.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_476
69Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/414 of 19 March 2020 amending Implementing Decision (EU)
2019/570 as regards medical stockpiling RescEU capacities (notified under document C(2020) 1827).
70 See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Request for Information No. 75A50120NEXTGENSNS,
available on beta.sam.gov.
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These two radically divergent U.S. approaches illustrate very different supply chain strategies.
The first may result in a “top-down” closely planned supply stockpile, which would ensure the
planned-for supplies are readily available but would increase risks of failures in planning and
execution – the same risks that haunted the national stockpile in the current pandemic. The
second initiative, by dispersing demand decisions to individual government users and leaving
fulfillment entirely to private parties, would allow available supply to meet public users’
demands much more efficiently but would run significant risk in execution because of the
purchasers’ weak tactical skills in purchasing.
As these examples and those from Europe have shown, solutions to coordinate purchasing in a
disaster mean taking risk -- tapping into private market and exposing emergency procurement
to market forces -- but the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that this will happen anyway, and
governments need to prepare better for the ferocity of competition in a catastrophe. The means
are at hand.
Conclusion
For centuries, economists have assumed that public procurement markets are fundamentally
efficient – auction-type markets that need to be adjusted only at the margins to meet special
government needs, such as military defense. As the COVID crisis made clear to all, public
procurement systems and the supply chains they manage are anything but efficient; they are
buffeted by political, natural and economic forces that originate outside the public procurement
systems themselves, and the procurement systems are shaped by rules requiring competition,
transparency and integrity in order to overcome the inertia inherent in any public function run
by intermediaries, not users. At the crossroads between public procurement law, organizational
theory, competition law, international commercial law, international law and health law, supply
management to respond to the COVID-19 crisis raised serious questions about whether the laws
that frame current purchasing practices should be revamped.
The COVID-19 emergency lasted relatively briefly, allowing time only for surprise and quick
reactions. As countries learn to manage in a new post-COVID era, they must also rethink
emergency purchasing procedures which are no longer justified in the face of a situation which
is admittedly difficult to control but which is no longer unpredictable. The return to normal
purchasing procedures is also now becoming an issue: while many countries have enacted
exceptional time-bound legislation, others have not set any terminal dates for their “emergency”
contracting rules which avoid traditional procurement norms.
The COVID-19 crisis has set a “new normal” in public procurement, by forcing a reassessment
of the old order. Old timelines and procedures were up-ended, and the established order of the
public marketplace collapsed as sellers took control and public agencies were no longer
monopsonists, but rather bitter competitors in a global market to save lives and maintain
governments’ legitimacy with their populations. The international trade regime which had
shaped the old order began to fall away too, and protectionism took on a new and potentially
deadly cast.
To make sense of all this, and to prepare for the gloomy prospect of a recurrence of the
pandemic or another disaster, new approaches are needed – though ones grounded in traditional
norms of transparence, competition and integrity. Public policy should rest on digital tools that
allow governments to respond to the exigencies of a crisis and the immediate needs of users,
19

while ensuring transparency and reliability of purchases, and the publicity of operations. The
challenge will be to deploy these tools, some public and some private, in way that preserves
public health policies, the challenges of efficient cross-border trade, and individual rights and
freedoms.
A rapidly globalizing procurement order will need to tolerate very different local perspectives
on what role, if any, an open and competitive public procurement system should play in a vital
commercial economy. The new order will need to assess the role of international law and public
international institutions, and of private purchasers supporting public purchasers. A postCOVID order will need to assimilate potentially very disparate goals in opening international
trade by lifting tariffs and non-tariff barriers, accommodating export controls and sectoral aid
for national substitution (for supplies deemed critical), and forced requisitions under what had
traditionally been considered wartime powers. Given the complexity and inherent tensions of
this “new normal,” in practice a systemic and holistic response will need to be defined by
regulation and bound by the rule of law, through rules and enforcement mechanisms calling for
upstream compliance and downstream sanctions. The alternative – a Hobbesian dystopia in
public procurement markets, which persisted beyond the pandemic – would leave scars deeper
than the disease.
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